Computing Reviews

Dynamics at the boundary of game theory and distributed computing
Jaggard A., Lutz N., Schapira M., Wright R. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation5(3):1-20,2017.Type:Article
Date Reviewed: 01/10/18

The combination of scientific maturity, knowledge, and intelligence can sometimes be the reason and origin of the creation of a worthy artifact. Some amalgams may seem strange at first glance, but more scrutiny demonstrates a great work--a good description for this paper.

Research on the dynamism of distributed environments via mixing of game theory ideas and distributed system lemmas is the main theme of the paper, wherein dynamism indicates a high level of interaction among the decision makers and equilibrium would not be achieved by the existence of a canonical element or governor.

The paper is a pure computer science artifact: a rich classical theoretical paper with plenty of great references concerned with theoretical distributed systems and game theory ideas. Algorithmic game theory, adaptive heuristics, game-theoretic work on asynchronous environments, and fault-tolerant computation self-stabilization are the pivotal topics that are discussed in the paper, which includes an application section. A model for asynchronous dynamic interaction is presented. The dynamism and evolution of the system are constructed from multiple definitions based on scheduling, action, and reaction of the nodes and system history. The authors propound “a general impossibility result for the convergence of a node’s actions under bounded-recall dynamics in asynchronous computational environments” as the main theorem, which is discussed and proved by related lemmas. The authors demonstrate the applicability of the theorem by addressing its deployment in many domains including games, circuit design, social networks, and routing. An evaluation of the complexity is the last section that is investigated prior to the conclusion of the paper.

This is a significant and worthy artifact with a high level of novelty.

Reviewer:  Mohammad Sadegh Kayhani Pirdehi Review #: CR145763 (1805-0254)

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